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The Economics of Local Tourist Systems 
 
Summary 
In this paper we analyse the Local Tourist System (LTS) as a particular case of 
Marshallian Industrial District. The LTS allows the identification of more effective 
policy tools for managing tourism. First, through the concept of LTS, the policy maker 
can take into account the complexity of tourism, characterised by a strong heterogeneity 
of goods, services and subjects involved; second, LTS helps promote a stronger co-
ordination between the public and the private sector, by identifying a homogeneous 
territory and recognising its importance in tourists' decisions; third, through the LTS the 
policymaker can analyze the externalities and promotes the idea of collaborating 
networks in a context of local development. In the LTS framework, the anticommon 
problem can be analysed and contrasted. As the tourist has to buy different but 
intertwined goods which compose the holiday package, the failure in one of the markets 
can lead to the overall failure of the package. A LTS policy has to: i) co-ordinate the 
price policy of the different firms supplying “single components” of the tourist product; 
ii) fix the price of the whole product; iii) impute a price to each component. We 
demonstrate that, through price policy co-ordination and under general conditions, the 
LTS can increase the size of tourism and the firms’ profits, thereby reaching a more 
effective and efficient target in tourism policy. The recent introduction of LTS in the 
Italian legislation can be seen as a positive attempt of improving co-ordination in a 
complex sector such as tourism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical approach to Tourism Economics is based on the systemic nature of tourism, 
stemming  both  from  the  heterogeneity  of  the  tourist  package,  and  from  the  existing  complex 
interactions  among  firms,  tourists  and  residents.  The  tourist  product  is  composed  by  several 
heterogeneous  but  complementary  goods  and  services  supplied  by  firms  belonging  to  different 
industries which are mainly, but not exclusively, located in the tourist destination.  
Recently,  this  systemic  nature  has  also  been  recognised  by  the  Italian  legislation  (Legge 
Quadro sul Turismo, No. 135/2001) by means of the creation of an economic policy instrument, 
namely Local Tourist System: 
 
“We  call  local  tourist  systems,  homogeneous  or  integrated  tourist  environments,  which  comprise 
territories  also  belonging  to  different  regions,  and  which  are  characterized  by  the  integrated  supply  of 
cultural,  environmental  goods  and  tourist  attractions,  including  typical  agricultural  and  local  handicraft 
products, or those characterised by a widespread presence of individual or associated tourist firms” (National 
Tourist Law Reform, Law 29 March 2001 No. 135, Our Translation).  
 
Moving  from  the  assumption  that  a  tourist  firm  has  some  specific  characteristics  which 
distinguish it from other typologies of firm, on one hand such a public intervention in the tourist 
sector assures support and development to tourist firms but, on the other hand, opens up potential 
consequences on market competition and equilibrium. 
The systemic nature of tourism and the identification with its geographical representation, that 
is, the destination, calls for the introduction of what we can call Local Tourist System (LTS). The 
LTS, as a matter of fact, highlights a potential trade-off problem: on one hand they potentially 
increase effectiveness of the “tourist system” as a whole, by raising their competitiveness with 
respect to other tourist destinations; on the other hand, they bring about a possible increase in prices 
and a fall in demand. These consequences are due to the fact that the LTS shares some similarities 
to both the Industrial District (ID) model,  that complies with firms' tendency of localizing in the 
same region,
1 and the Cultural District (CD) model based on the integration in the same region (that 
can  be  of  very  different  sizes,  from  metropolitan  to  neighbourhoods)  of  artistic  and  cultural 
activities that, given the territorial identification, acquire their own idiosyncrasy.
2 
Each type of district aims to increase the efficiency of production and promotes the overall 
development of the local territory
3 (wherein the territory can be identified with the municipality, the 
county or the region); however – as it will be shown – although there are common goals, there are 
relevant differences, too. 
Therefore, for the theoretical analysis, a model which allows to emphasize the differences and 
the similarities between LTS, ID and CD has to be introduced. This will be done in the Section 2, 
where these three different forms of district are introduced and analyzed in terms of prices, profits 
                                                 
1 Among the several works on industrial districts, see Becattini (1989 and 2000). Industrial districts are very relevant to 
the Italian economy, whose industrial organisation, particularly in the Centre-North, is characterised by a high number 
of small and medium size firms which are geographically located in limited and hyper-specialised territories. Such a 
characteristic is considered one of the successful features of the Italian economic development of the last decades. 
Among the most known industrial districts, footwear in the Marche region, Sassuolo and Carpi pottery, Prato textiles, 
iron rods of Brescia, furniture factory in Brianza, eyeglasses in Cadore have to be mentioned as few of the many 
examples. 
2 On this point see Cuccia and Santagata (2003), and Santagata (2004). The development of the cultural filière as a 
possible (economic) specialisation of a geographical area is due to the Greater London Council case, based upon the 
integration between cultural activities and relevant sectors of the tourist system. The birth of CD may be a spontaneous 
process, as in the West End of London, the Greenwich Village in New York or the Rive Gauche in Paris; else, they may 
be the result of a development program or an urban refurbishment, as in Glasgow or in the Museum Quarter of Vienna 
(see Candela and Scorcu, 2004). 
3 Someone calls them “territorial policies” and especially “territorial policies  for tourism” (Costa et al., 2001), pp. 38-
39.  
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and local population welfare – will be outlined. In Section 3, the reasons for State intervention in 
LTS will be analyzed. The focus will be, in particular, on coordination failures since, due to the 
systemic nature of the tourist good, an anticommon puzzle, similar but specular to the common one, 
arises. Section 4 outlines the economic policy discussion. 
  
 
2 A simplified model of districts  
 
2.1 Definitions and symbols 
In order to study the theoretical aspects of industrial districts (ID), cultural districts (CD) and 
Local Tourist Systems (LTS), a simplified model with two regions, k = 1, 2, and two goods, j = x, y, 
has to be introduced. Moreover, two working hypothesis as regards geographical organisation of 
production, has to be considered: 
a)  non systemic production: Region 1 only produces good x, with y1 = 0, while region 2 only 
produces good y, with x2 = 0; 
b)  system: the whole Region (1,2) produces both goods, and it is defined a system. 
Assuming that every externality of production is being internalized by the local policy maker, 
the group of firms, which coincides with the region itself, can be considered a regional monopolist.  
The local demand for goods x and y, approximated in a linear and separable form, in the case 
of non systemic production, is: 
 
x = f(px) » a – bpx  demand for good x, with price px           [1a] 
y = g(py) » m – npy  demand for good y, with price py.           [1b] 
 
Three district typologies previously are introduced. 
 
A) The Industrial District. In the ID constituted by the whole Region (1,2), demand functions 
for goods x and y – which are represented by eqs. [1] – do not change. However, an effect occurs 
with  respect  to  costs;  namely,  externalities  due  to  Marshallian  agglomeration  economies  are 
internalised into the cost function of both goods. Hence, total costs Cj(.) of firms pertaining to a 
sector also depend on the production level of firms of the other sector, as in eq. [2] that we assume  
for both goods x and y in these particular specifications: 
 
Cx = H(x, y)  » x
2 – y
2                     [2a] 
Cy = K(x, y)  » y
2 – x
2                    [2b] 
 
B) The Cultural district. On the contrary, if Regions (1,2) constitutes a CD, there is a change 
in demand for goods x and y with respect to case of separation between Regions 1 and 2. This is due 
to the idiosyncratic effect stemming from the quality surplus identified  into the cultural good. 
Effects on the cost side, on the contrary, can be ignored since externalities are a typical industrial 
effect, not a characteristic of cultural production; by promoting the comparison and competition 
among artists, the CD increases quality and creativity of its own artistic good, but it would not 
necessarily increase productivity. Therefore, it follows that eqs. [1] can be augmented with by a 
parameter q  in the consumer’s reserve price, as in eqs. [3]: 
 
x = f’(px ; q) » qa – bpx                   [3a] 
y = g’(py ; q) » qm – npy                  [3b] 
 
where we assume that the effect q > 1 is common and equal for both goods characterizing the CD.  
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Since we assumed that interaction does not produce any effect on the production side, cost 
functions in CD are separated, as in [4] that we assume for both goods x and y in these particular 
specifications:  
 
Cx = H(x) »  x
2                     [4a] 
Cy = K(y) »  y
2                      [4b] 
 
C) The Local Tourist System. Tourist demand can be represented by the quantity of goods 
demanded in the destination by tourists, function of N, for example the number of nights (or stays) 
spent in the destination. Of course, if there are two separate regions, tourists will have at their 
disposal a tourist good “monotonous” in each region, while the tourist product in LTS will include 
both goods offered, becoming heterogeneous. According to these different hypotheses, we have: 
 
a)  tourist demand in Region 1 is: Nx = A – Bv1 , with v1 = hpx , since the region offers in its 
tourist product just h unity of good  x  per night spent; 
b)  tourist demand in Region 2 is: Ny = A – Bv2 , with v2 = kpy, since the region offers in its 
tourist product just  k  unity of good  y  per night spent; 
c)  tourist demand in the LTS composed of Region (1, 2) is: Nx
LTS = sA – Bv1 and Ny
LTS = sA 
– Bv2.  
Since the region offers a tourist product of higher quality compared to the one supplied by the 
two separate regions, one can assume that: 
 
s > 1                      [5] 
 
Since LTS firms produce goods (x and y) that enter into the tourist product, respectively for 
the amount of h and k,
4 total demand for each good is the sum of indigenous and tourist demands, 
which we assume independents.
5 Therefore, the overall demand for goods x and y, in Regions 1 and 
2 respectively, are the following: 
 
X = x + hN1 =  f(px) + hN1 = (a + hA1) – (b + h
2B)px           [6] 
Y = y + kN2 = g(py) + kN2 = (m + kA2) – (n + k
2B)py             [7] 
 
In the LTS composed by the Region (1,2), because of the higher quality hypothesis, local plus 
tourist demands are: 
 
X = x + hNx
LTS = f(px) + hNx
LTS = (a + hsA) – (b + h
2B)px          [6a] 
Y = y + kNy
LTS = g(py) + kNy
LTS = (m + ksA) – (n + k
2B)py          [7a] 
 
Obviously, since the tourist product is a combination of different goods, local firms enjoy 
Marshallian agglomeration economies; hence, the positive externality effect on production costs 
occurs in the LTS, as well as within the ID. Therefore, total production costs of firms of one sector 
also depend on the production of the other sector, confirming for the LTS the same cost structure 
[2a] and [2b] of the ID, for which we assume the same specification: 
 
                                                 
4 An example might illustrate this assumption. If the good x is the “board”, px is the price of daily board price and 
includes two meals a day. We can assume that tourists consume one meal per day in a restaurant (for instance, in case of 
a “half-board” stay, because the other meal is already included in the lodging): the demand N1 = A1 – Bv1 , with v1 = hpx 
, takes on, in that case, the value h = ½. The overall demand X = x + hN is consequently made up by a local component 
(x) and by the tourist component given by nights spent N weighted for h = 1/2 taking into consideration that tourists 
consume just one meal per day and not two meals. 
5 That is, we leave out externalities between tourists and residents (see Candela, Castellani and Dieci, 2004).  
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H = x
2 – y




All the key elements to assess the optimal policy of  ID, CD and LTS are at a glance, since 
regions can be considered as monopolistic firms where the policy maker aims at maximising the 
overall profit. Moreover, we can also assess the welfare effect on the local community of each of 
the three cases considered. The simplest way to do so it is to introduce the i-th representative 




1-a                      [8] 
 
where 0 < a < 1, and Qi > 0 is a quality parameter which measures the satisfaction that the i-th 
agent  gets  from  the  goods.  Given  disposable  income  Yi    and  prices  px  and  py,  the  consumer 
maximises eq. [8] by allocating a fixed share of his own income to each good, according to the 
elasticity of the utility function:
6  
 
Ui = Qi(aYi / px)
a[(1 – a)Yi / py]
1-a = QiYi (a / px)
a [(1 – a) / py)
1 - a  
 
To estimate the change in welfare for the i-th agent, we compute the total differential of the Ui: 
 
dUi =  (Ui / Qi)dQi + (Ui / Yi)dYi – a(Ui / px)dpx – (1 – a)(Ui / py)dpy       [9] 
 
 
2.2 Industrial regions and industrial district 
Let  us  consider  model  A  of  previous  section,  for  industrial  regions,  organised  or  not  as 
industrial  districts,  and  compute  market  equilibria  and  welfare  of  the  local  population  in  the 
different cases.  
Referring to the more general case of an Industrial district (1,2) producing goods x and y, 
production goal for the ID coincides with the joint profit maximisation of both firms which, being a 
district, avoid the market failure by internalizing the externality effect: 
 
maxpx,py P12 = xf(px) + yg(py) – H(x , y) – K(x, y) = 
                                             = apx – bpx





2)      [10] 
 
If Region 1 produces only good x (for y º 0, K(.) º 0) the production goal for Region 1 reduces to 
the profit maximisation of firms producing good x: 
 
maxpx P1 = apx – bpx
2 – x
2                                           [10a] 
 
If Region 2 produces only good y (for x º 0, H(.) º 0) the production goal for Region 2 reduces to 
the profit maximisation of firms producing good y 
 
maxpy P2 =  mpy – npy
2 – y
2                                                                                              [10b] 
 
From the first order conditions of eqs [10] we obtain the prices of regions: 
 
-  in Region 1: px = a / 2b + x 
-  in Region 2: py = m / 2n + y 
-  in the ID  (1, 2): px
ID
 = a / 2b  and  py
ID
 = m / 2n 
                                                 
6 The Cobb-Douglas has constant utility elasticities therefore the consumer spends for each good a constant income 
share.  
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  e py > py
ID
 , and hence an increase in the quantity of the two goods 
supplied by the market.  
Such results are due to the positive externality effect on both production costs stemming from 
geographical agglomeration, an effect that can not be internalised if the two industrial regions are 
separated and independent. 
With respect to the welfare effect, eq. [9] shows that consumers always gain by the emergence 
of the ID, since the lower prices and the consequent increase in quantity is a sufficient condition 
bringing to (with dQi = dYi = 0) an increase in the consumer indirect utility level, dUi > 0. 
 
2.3 Cultural regions and cultural district 
Let us consider model B of section 2.1, for regions which can be either organised or not as 
cultural  districts,  and  compute  market  equilibrium  and  welfare  of  the  local  population  in  the 
different cases.  
In the case of the Cultural district (1,2) producing goods x and y under the same brand, the 
production goal for the CD is the joint profit maximisation of (cultural) firms, which discount a 
positive quality effect q  on their respective products, recognised as parts of the same cultural 
package: 
 
Maxpx, py P12 = xf’(px) + yg’(py) – H(x) – K(y) =  qapx – bpx
2  + qmpy – npy
2 – x
2 – y
2  [11] 
 
If Region 1 specializes in cultural cultural good x (for y º 0, K(.) º 0 and q = 1) the previous 
expression reduced to: 
 
maxpx P1 = apx – bpx
2 – x
2                                           [11a] 
 
whereas  if  Region  2  specializes  in  good  y  (for  x  º  0,  H(.)  º  0  and  q  =  1)  the  corresponding 
expression is: 
 
maxpy P2 =  mpy – npy
2 – y
2                                                                                              [11b] 
 
From the first order conditions of eqs [11] we obtain the prices of regions and CD: 
 
-  in Region 1: px = a / 2b + x 
-  in Region 2: py = m / 2n + y 
-  in the CD (1, 2): px
CD
 = qa / 2b + x and  py
DC
 = qm / 2n + y 
 




  e py < py
CD
 , due to the idiosyncratic effect recognised for cultural 
goods of the district. In the CD, prices increase as a result of the quality improvement, dpx > 0 e dpy 
> 0, hence bringing about a reduction in the consumer’s utility. However, the quality improvement 
brings about an increase in utility, dQi > 0. Then, in case income remains unchanged, dYi = 0, 
consumers gain from CD only if the following condition is verified: 
 
 (Ui / Qi) dQi > a(Ui / px) dpx + (1 – a)(Ui / py )dpy            [12] 
 
Nevertheless, [12] is often the expected outcome, since it is the micro-economic precondition 
supporting  the  assumption  that  the  CD  “protects”  the  market  for  cultural  goods.  If  [12]  is  not 
verified, the representative consumer would “reject” the district organisation and demand functions  
  7 
[3a] and [3b] would show q < 1. Therefore, the existence of a CD is likely to be related to an higher 
consumer’s welfare.  
 
2.4 Tourist-industrial destinations and Local Tourist Systems 
Consider now model C in section 2.1, for regions which can be either organised or not as 
Local Tourist Systems. The goal of Local Tourist System (1,2) is profit maximisation of the joint 
production of goods x and y, supplied to both tourists and residents: 
 
maxpx,py P12 = Xpx + Ypy – H(X, Y) – K(X, Y) =  
=  (a + hsA)px – (b + h
2B)px
2 + (m + ksA)py – (n + k
2B)py




2    [13] 
 
If we have the Tourist-industrial region 1 (Y º 0, K(.) º 0) the overall goal for Region 1 is profit 
maximisation from the production of good x, supplied to tourists and residents: 
 
maxpx P1 = (a + hA)px – (b + h
2B)px
2 – X
2                        [13a] 
 
whereas in the Tourist-industrial region 2 (X º 0, H(.) º 0) the overall goal is profit maximisation 
from the production of good y, supplied to tourists and residents: 
 
maxpy P2 =   (m + kA)py – (n + k
2B)py
2 – Y
2                        [13b] 
 
From the first order conditions of eqs [13] we obtain the prices of tourist-industrial regions and 
LTS: 
  
-  in Tourist-industrial region 1: px = [(a + hA) / 2(b + h
2B)] + X 
-  in Tourist-industrial region 2: py = [(m + kA) / 2(n + k
2B)] + Y  
-  in the LTS (1, 2): px
LTS
 = (a + hsA) / 2(b + h
2B) and py
LTS
 = (m + ksA) / 2(n + k
2B) 
 
In  this  case  the  LTS  does  not  produce  any  certain  effect  on  prices,  with  respect  to  the  two 




 – px = hA(s  - 1) / 2(b + h
2B) – X 
py
LTS
 – py = kA(s  - 1) / 2(n + k
2B) – Y 
 
since,  for  eq.  [5],  s  >  1.  This  conclusion  stems  from  a  twofold  effect  of  LTS:  on  one  hand, 
agglomeration  economies  reduce  the  average  cost  of  goods;  on  the  other  hand,  the  quality 
improvement in the tourist product brought about by its completion increases tourist demand. 
Therefore, the LTS shows similarities to both ID (the tourist good is a bundle of goods that 
enjoys the advantages of external returns to scale) and CD (the tourist good can be assimilated to a 
cultural good and hence it takes profit from the idiosyncratic image of the destination).
7 The LTS is 
therefore a complex system: it is not only an ID, since the territorial aggregation also has an effect 
on the demand side; it is not only a CD, since the aggregation also has an effect on the average costs 
of production. Therefore, the LTS does not provide neither a unique result on the price system, nor 
– as we now highlight – on total welfare of local population. 
In principle, we have to distinguish two cases: if the LTS brings about a price reduction, the 
local consumer – as in the ID case – surely takes advantage of it. But if prices increases, the change 
in utility of the agent i depends on whether or not she takes part in the distribution of profits 
generated by tourism itself; in fact if we assume that resident i.th of the destination, which demands 
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, unlike industrial districts, tourism districts need a widespread supply also of cultural and environmental 
goods, as well as tourist attractions, typical crafts and agricultural products, etc.  
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are [1a] and [1b], do not consume the local tourist product, she do not take advantage from its 
quality improvement, dQi = 0. 
Alternatively, if the representative agent receives income from the Local Tourist System, dYi 
> 0, she will have an increase in her own indirect utility if: 
  
(Ui / Ri)dYi > a(Ui / px)dpx + (1 - a)(Ui / py )dpy            [14] 
 
Otherwise, if the resident gets a job in some other sector and does not get any income from 
the Local Tourist System, dYi = 0, there exists not such a condition to make eq. [9] positive: the 
local consumer who does not take part in the distribution of income generated by tourism – or who 
receives  an  insignificant  share  such  that  eq.  [14]  would  not  be  fulfilled  –  does  not  get  any 
improvement from the LTS and suffers a reduction in his welfare, dUi < 0. 
To sum up, while in our framework ID increases consumer’s welfare, and while we may 
suppose that CD is likely to produce an increase in welfare, with respect to LTS the answer is not 
clear. When LTS is associated with an increase in prices, the welfare change is not uniquely defined 
and local families’ gains depend on the way income, generated from extra-tourism attracted by the 
better quality of the tourist product in the destination organised as a LTS,
8 is distributed. 
 
 
3. The state role in LTS: coordination of tourist firms 
 
3.1 The role of the destination authority 
Public intervention in the tourist sector is needed for two fundamental reasons: i) to finance 
tourist public goods: those structures and infrastructures needed to complete the tourist product and 
to increase the competitiveness of the whole destination and for which the private market fails;
9 ii) 
to solve a potential coordination problem arising when private firms supply different goods and 
services, that compose the whole tourist product. This latter issue, which can be considered an 
anticommon problem, is analysed in this section, with particular reference to the role that the public 
authority of the tourist destination may play. 
We develop a very simple model. In the destination there are just two types of firms: hotels, 
offering accommodation but any board, and restaurants, offering board, but which are not in a 
position to offer accommodation. Under these conditions, tourists intending to spend a holiday in 
the destination have to buy services from both firms, which can individually exclude the tourists by 
denying  them  board  or  accommodation.  In  the  tourism  sector,  whose  product  combines 
heterogeneous  goods  supplied  by  various  and  different  firms,  this  situation  easily  occurs.  This 
condition is known as anticommon, a situation in which there is property fragmentation
10 – opposed 
to the common condition, characterised by the lack of property rights.
11 
                                                 
8 This rationale leads to the issue of tourist enclaves and to the income distribution of local communities in developing 
countries specialized in tourism. We know that these communities do not enjoy the advantages of the tourist multiplier, 
but we have now demonstrated that they may also suffer a damage from the increase in prices due to tourist arrivals. 
Nevertheless, this effect may also occur in developed country destinations: families of local workers employed in 
sectors which are not connected to tourism do not get any additional income; on the contrary, they may suffer the 
increase in prices of, for example, real estates and building lands. Hence, the LTS leads us directly to the inequality 
issue and, from here, to the problem of social sustainability of the development model based on tourist specialization. 
9 See Candela and Figini (2005), chap. 11. 
10  Obviously, this problem arises to where different firms produce “components” which contribute to the production of 
the final good. 
11 The anticommon concept has been introduced by Michelman (1982) and has been developed by Heller (1998 and 
1999). See Parisi et al. (2000) and Parisi et al. (2004). The common good is a good for which property rights are not 
precisely defined, being this way at everyone’s disposable (Hardin 1968).  
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If pa and pb are respectively the accommodation and the board price, the tourist product, 
composed by one unit of each service per day, will have the price v equal to v = pa + pb. Tourist 
demand is expressed by the number of nights spent N and, in this case, can be considered equal to: 
 
 N = a – v = a – pa –  pb 
 
If  we  assume,  by  the  sake  of  simplification,  that  production  costs  are  null,  the  profit 
maximisation problem for the accommodation and restaurant firms are, respectively: 
 
maxpa pa = paN = pa(a – pa –  pb)                [15] 
maxpb pb = pbN = pb(a – pa –  pb)                        [15a] 
 
and the corresponding first order conditions from which we get the accommodation equilibrium and 
the board equilibrium prices are: 
 
pa = (a – pb) / 2                               [16] 
pb = (a – pa) / 2                             [16a] 
 
We can solve system [16] and [16a] by substitution and, in the specification of our example, 
we get the following equilibrium prices: 
 
pb* = pa* = a / 3                    [17] 
 
Therefore,  a  tourist  demanding  the  tourist  product  N  supplied  by  the  destination,  and 
composed by one unit of accomodation and board per day, pays a total price v equal to:   
 
v* = 2a / 3                      [18] 
 





* = (a / 3) (a / 3) = a
2 / 9                [19] 
 
Can there be any improvement from this situation? Let us assume now that there is a unique 
firm offering board and accommodation at the same time, eventually coordinated by a destination 
authority, that assume the role of a policy maker for tourism sector. That is as much as to say that 
the supply problem can be analysed focussing on the profit maximisation of the whole destination. 
By considering the same demand function N = a – v we get: 
 
maxv p = vN = v(a – v)                   [20] 
 
and from the first order condition we get the equilibrium price for the destination is: 
 
v** = a / 2                      [21] 
 
Comparing eq. [21] with eq. [18], we note that v* > v** whereas N** = a / 2 > a / 3 = N*. 
Therefore, without the coordination of the destination authority, the price of the tourist product is 
as a whole too high and consequently tourist nights spent in the destination are too low. 
Since we assume that both hotels and restaurants of this example are symmetric as regards 
costs (both null), the policy maker of the destination can decide the optimal structure of prices for  
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both accommodation and board, pa** = pb** = a / 4. These posted prices imply, by means of eqs. 




**= (a / 4)(a / 2) = a
2 / 8                [22] 
 
Profits shown in eq. [22] are obviously higher that those in eq. [19] since a
2 / 8 > a
2 / 9; we 
can  conclude  that  in  the  LTS,  when  the  local  government  solves  the  coordination  problem  by 
imposing (or proposing) the optimal price structure, both the accommodation and the catering firms 
increase their profits, together with a positive effect on tourists, who can gain from lower prices.  
Therefore, in the LTS, the policymaker should: i) coordinate firms producing the goods which 
enter  the  tourist  package;  ii)  fix  the  price  of the  whole  product;  iii)  impute  the  price  for  each 
component of the tourist product, such as to suggest a coordination of posted prices. Coordination is 
needed since the tourist product turn out to be an anticommon, in which property is shared among 
several firms supplying different parts of the final good. In other words, there is an excess of 
property rights in the economic sense. Coordination intervention by the policy maker leads to both 
an increase in profits for all firms, and to a greater number of nights spent by tourists. 
 
3.2 The role of the tour operator between the destination authority and the tourist firm 
The positive role in solving the coordination problem is not an exclusive prerequisite of the 
public  authority:  if  the  policy  maker  refuses  the  coordination  responsibility,  the  anticommon 
problem  could  find  a  solution  in  the  establishment  of  a  “centralised”  tourist  firm:    the  tour 
operator.
12 
The tour operator offers to local firms a “vuoto per pieno”  contract at the  discounted price 
(pj - d), with the same discount d applied to both tourist firms. The “full board” package is offered 
directly  by  the  tour  operator  at  price  v.  The  non-coordinated  equilibrium  price  constitutes  a 
constraint for the tour operator in determining the contract, which must be accepted by the local 
tourist firm. Its program is therefore:
13 
 
maxv,d pto = vN – (pa – d)N – (pb – d)N = (v – pa –  pb + 2d)N         [23] 
s.c. 
         N = a – v 
(pa – d)N ³ a
2 / 9   participation constraint for the accommodation firm 
(pb – d)N ³ a
2 / 9   participation constraint for the restaurant 
 
as a
2 / 9 is the profit which the firms will gain in the case of a direct offer to the tourists, without 
intermediation (and in the case of rent of their full production capacity).  
  Without the tour operator, the equilibrium price [17] will be pa = pd = a / 3 and the two 
different participation constraints collapse into the same inequality.  As usual in the agency models, 
if  we  assume  that  the  principal  gives  the  agency  the  minimum  acceptable  profit,  from  the 
constraints we get the (provisional) value of d: 
 
d = a / 3 – a
2 / 9(a – v)                    [24] 
 
Having substitute [24] in the tour operator profit function, we obtain: 
                                                 
12 The tour operator signs “insurance” contracts with hotels, restaurants, air companies, etc., which accept a lower but 
certain price by transferring risk to the tour operator (see Mussoni (2004), Castellani and Mussoni (2004)). Firms accept 
the coordination role of the tour operator if, although accepting a lower price, they end up with equal or higher profits. 
Therefore, also the tour operator can play a positive role in the LTS, by imposing a private solution – automatic and 
with no public intervention – to the anticommon failure. The analogy with the case of common goods, which “ tragedy” 
may be avoided by giving property rights to either public or private monopoly, is therefore complete. 
13 On the optimal tourist contract in stochastic environment, see Mussoni (2004) and Castellani and Mussoni (2004).  
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maxv pto = v(a – v) – 2a
2 / 9                  [25] 
 
The first order condition [25] defines the solution vto= a / 2 = v**, the same optimal offer 
selected by the policymaker (see [21]). However, even if the tour operator solution mimics the 
social optimum, the profit for the two firm is different: by construction the tour operator reaps of 
the whole increase in profits:
14 
 
pa = pb = a
2 / 9    and    pto = 5a
2 / 9   being d = 2a / 9 
 
Obviously, several intermediate solutions are possible, but always arises a distributive conflict 






Industrial,  Cultural  and  Local  Tourist  Systems  all  emerge  for  one  reason:  to  create  an 
economic advantage due to a geographical integration. Nevertheless, the simple models presented in 
this paper demonstrate that these common objectives should not hide crucial differences with regard 
to characteristics, effects and strategies.
15  
The ID arises as a consequence of important positive externalities, in terms of reduction of the 
average costs enjoyed by firms located in the same area. Firms perceive the advantage of a common 
localisation, cost reduction and profit increase: economic rationality leads firms to such industrial 
agglomeration.  In  the  Marshallian  perspective,  public  intervention  is  unnecessary  to  manage 
industrial  districts,  since  congestion  and  decay  of  the  territory  (external  diseconomies)  would 
replace economies, making unprofitable the over- localisation in an ID. As ID allow firms to access 
more efficient production organisations and techniques, they also advantage consumers, who share 
the average cost reduction by means of a price reduction. 
CD,  on  the  contrary,  arise  from  the  need  of  cultural  identification  of  the  territory; 
consequently the territory recognises a idiosyncratic aspect in its cultural product; the CD goal is to 
make the product promptly recognizable (and certified) by connoisseurs and cultural consumers, 
therefore increasing their reservation price.
16  
  
“One of the institutional conditions that favoured the economic growth of highly integrated territories, 
has  been  the  assignment  of  collective  property  rights  on  local  resources.  Collective  property  rights 
(territorial, product, as well as cultural labels, etc.) are a way to offer efficient economic incentives and better 
development perspectives to local producers. Furthermore, these collective rights protect from counterfacting 
and dumping. In the end, they represent a great contribution to the construction of the public perception of 
the site” (Santagata et al., 2004, p. 60. Our own translation). 
 
Nevertheless, the establishment of a CD does not automatically break out as in the ID case. 
Actually, the CD develops a territorial brand from which all local cultural firms wish to be covered, 
with the risk of “playing down”, through overproduction, the image itself of the cultural district: the 
                                                 
14 In the more general case the solution requires the Khun-Tucker approach.. 
15 The previous quantitative results are not robust, being dependent upon very specific (and ad hoc) assumptions. 
(separability, specific functional forms,…). A natural extension of this framework should be the computation of a GE 
model,  grounded  on  strong  microeconomic  principles.  Most  of  our  qualitative  results,  however,  should  remain 
unaffected. 
16 See Candela and Scorcu (2004).  
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CD typically presents a common problem.
17 From this point of view, CD needs public intervention 
to deal with the distribution of rights to enjoy product brand (Cuccia and Santagata 2003). In the 
end, CD, if successful, leads to an increase in the consumer surplus, since the positive change in 
utility induced by a better quality more than compensate for the sacrifice of higher prices. 
The LTS comes out from the observation that the tourist product is composed by a bundle of 
heterogeneous different goods and services, complementing to each other in the tourist destination; 
hence,  the  LTS  solves  production  coordination  and  completion.  Compared  to  other  industries, 
coordination rules are needed in tourism since “no activity is more difficult than the tourist one”. 
However, as shown in this paper, such a combination may not automatically develop, since tourist 
production presents an anticommon problem and the policy maker intervention is needed: LTS 
needs intervention for its definition and implementation, although also a private intervention by a 
tour operator could solve the problem. 
In a LTS the role of the public authority is twofold: coordinate interaction among firms, and  
complete the tourist product by supplying the infrastructures and services needed. 
Since the ultimate effect of LTS on prices – pushed down by agglomeration externalities but 
pushed up by extra demand in tourism due to higher quality – is not uniquely defined, it may 
happen that total welfare in the destination depends on the way revenue from tourism is locally 
distributed.  
Table  1  sums  up  our  conclusions;  it  can  be  argued  that  there  are  more  diversities  than 
similarities among the three models of local production organization presented in this paper. 
 
Table 1 – A Comparison of industrial, cultural and Local Tourist Systems 
Type of district  Reasons for 
the birth 
Need for public 
intervention 




Industrial district  Externalities  No  ---  Welfare increases 
Cultural district  Product 
idiosyncrasy  Yes  Remedy to the problem of 
commons 
Welfare increases in 
case of success 
Local Tourist System  Goods and 
services 
combination 
Yes  Remedy to the problem of 
anticommons 
Uncertain result 
depending on the income 
distribution 
 
ID and CD importance in real world economies has been widely recognised for a long time, 
but also LTS are gaining importance and highlight the relevance of a policy approach based on the 
destination. In Italy, a sort of LTS has been introduced by the law, explicitly denominated Sistema 
Turistico Locale (STL) in the National Tourist Act (No. 135 of  2001). STLs represent a policy tool 
aimed  at  favouring  the  integrated  development  of  tourism,  by  taking  into  consideration  the 
heterogeneity  and  complexity  of  the  phenomenon,  and  by  favouring  firms  aggregation  and  the 
public and private linkages.  
STLs represent a new way to conceive and administrate the territory aiming at overcoming the 
existing fragmentations of the Italian territory, enhancing the integration between tourism and other 
industries, and by looking endogenously for the optimal size of the destination. In opting for the 
institutional introduction of the STL, the policymaker aims at stimulate the development of tourism 
even to the detriment of possible drawbacks on competition or, rather, competition between STL is 
favoured to the detriment of competition between single tourist firms. 
  
                                                 
18 Common goods (Hardin, 1968) risk depletion if access is not regulated. To investigate this issue see Balducci et al. 
(2001).  
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